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INTRODUCTION 
n recent years, commercial arbitration has become the in-
strument of choice for participants in international trade 
seeking “a workable mechanism for swift resolution of day–to–
day disputes.”1  The reason for this development lies in more 
than the fact that arbitration presents parties with a viable al-
ternative to the typically expensive, lengthy, and complex liti-
gation proceedings.2  Since arbitration is always the result of an 
agreement, the parties also benefit from wide latitude in setting 
the ground rules of the decision–making process.  As a result, 
the dispute resolution process, as well as the arbitrator’s deci-
sion, can be tailored to the wishes of both parties, increasing 
their confidence in the impartiality of the decision–maker and 
of the expected outcome.  Secondly, arbitrators are generally 
experts in the field and thus inspire a great deal of confidence 
as effective and impartial decision–makers.  Finally, as a result 
of the widespread accession of United Nations (“UN”) member 
states to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”)3, in most 
cases international arbitral awards are much easier to enforce 
across international jurisdictional lines. 
Realizing that arbitration brought relief to overcrowded judi-
cial dockets, the Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme 
Court”) has embraced arbitration as a valid alternative to judi-
cial resolution of disputes, but not “without regard to the wishes 
of the contracting parties.”4  Rather, in offering its endorsement, 
the Supreme Court has relied upon principles of contract law to 
prevent state and federal interference with the arbitral process.5  
However arbitral awards still need judicial sanction in order to 
  
 1. See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
 2. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS: MELTING 
THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1, 4, 134 (1989). 
 3. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, Jun.10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective in the United 
States on December 29, 1970). 
 4. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman-Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56–57 
(1995); Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. 
University, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
 5. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57. 
I
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be enforced.6  The latter step of the process can be a source of 
extensive dispute in cases involving enforcement of foreign 
awards.     
One of the most important issues that has recently arisen in 
reviewing arbitral awards is to what extent parties can rely on 
freedom of contract to expand the scope of judicial review be-
yond the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), 
which incorporates the New York Convention.7   As a result of 
the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuits which 
have considered the issue have arrived at diametrically opposed 
conclusions.8  However, these decisions share a common meth-
odology in arriving at their results.  All circuits have recognized 
that any resolution of this proposition necessitates a balancing 
act between two sets of competing interests: the integrity of the 
judicial or arbitral institution, pitted against the freedom of 
contracting  parties to tailor a private dispute resolution system 
to their particular needs.  This Note, in weighing the same con-
cerns, will attempt to illustrate why several circuits that have 
allowed for expanded review of arbitral awards, have reached 
the correct result.  In support of this argument, this Note will 
  
 6. See Edward C. Okeke, Judicial Review of Foreign Arbitral Awards: 
Bane, Boon or Boondogle? 10 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29, (1997) (stating that the 
“role of the judiciary in arbitral process admits of no controversy; this, per-
haps, accounts for the paucity of decisional law on the subject”). 
 7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1994).  The scope of this Note is restricted to the 
issue of expansion of judicial review. While many of the same arguments can 
be advanced in support of restricting judicial review, a discussion of that issue 
necessarily implicates several additional problems, which are not addressed 
here.  One commentator has correctly noted that “as a matter of logic, it is 
difficult to see why parties may agree to expand judicial review but not to 
eliminate it.  Assuming an arms–length transaction, there is no reason why 
the parties should not be allowed to put themselves entirely at the mercy of 
private arbitrators. ... If the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration re-
quires enforcement of private agreements to expand judicial review, it would 
seem to apply a fortiori to agreements restricting or eliminating judicial re-
view.”  James B. Hamlin, Contractual Alteration of the Scope of Judicial Re-
view – The US Experience, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 47, 56 (1998).  
 8. In favor of expansion of review, see LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera 
Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Tele-
communications Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir.  1995).  Opposed to expansion of 
review, see Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); Chi-
cago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun–Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 
(7th Cir. 1991), and, most recently, LaPine Technology Corp., v. Kyocera 
Corp., 2003 WL 22025130 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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discuss both the public policy considerations at play in this de-
bate, and the available Supreme Court and circuit court deci-
sions. 
Part I of this Note discusses the FAA and the New York Con-
vention, and the public policy considerations they encompass.  
Part II will present a synopsis of the decisions in which federal 
appellate courts have addressed expansion of judicial review in 
the domestic setting, and the justifications they offered in 
reaching their respective outcomes.  First, this part will present 
the views of the circuits that have adopted the institutional in-
tegrity viewpoint and concluded that expansion of judicial re-
view is intolerable based on its impact on the role of the courts 
in resolving disputes.  Second, this paper will present a synop-
sis of the decisions where courts focusing on freedom of contract 
principles have chosen to defer to the wishes of the parties and 
enforce agreements for expanded review.  Part III will provide a 
brief summary of the conclusions reached by some foreign juris-
dictions in addressing the issue of expanded judicial review.  
Part IV will then present an analysis of the arguments ad-
vanced by the institutional integrity and freedom of contract 
advocates, address the public policy interests raised by the is-
sue of expanded review, and discuss their application to the is-
sue of federal court jurisdiction.  Finally, this Note will examine 
the international implications of expanded review and offer 
some conclusions as to the likely future developments regarding 
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.   
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
AND THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 
In discussing the issue of expanded review of arbitral awards, 
an analysis of the underlying statutes is a sine qua non prereq-
uisite of any complete examination.  Such an analysis is war-
ranted for several reasons.  First, the substantive law in this 
area is statutory.  Secondly, the legislative, rather than com-
mon law, origin of the current law on arbitration is of particular 
significance because it provides evidence of the difference in 
objectives pursued by the Federal Arbitration Act and the New 
York Convention.  While the FAA and New York Convention 
were both enacted to eliminate judicial reluctance toward arbi-
tration by guaranteeing the enforceability of agreements to ar-
bitrate, the New York Convention also had an additional objec-
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tive, namely the unification of the world–wide enforcement 
standards for international arbitral awards.9  Since the New 
York Convention takes precedence when applied to the en-
forcement of international arbitral awards, U.S. courts must 
keep in mind both the objectives of the FAA and the New York 
Convention. 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
1. Legislative History 
The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925, and it con-
stituted the entire arbitration law of the U.S. until the ratifica-
tion of the New York Convention.10  Chapter I still constitutes 
the law affecting U.S. domestic arbitration, i.e. arbitration cases 
involving U.S. interstate commerce, where the arbitration was 
conducted under domestic law, or the award was made in the 
U.S.11  As discussed in detail below, the New York Convention 
governs in arbitrations deemed to be “foreign” pursuant to the 
statute, and Chapter I of the FAA acts merely as a gap–filler. 
2. Public Policy Considerations 
One of the main motivations of Congress in enacting the FAA 
was to reverse the long–standing reluctance of U.S. courts to 
accept arbitration as a legitimate form of dispute resolution, 
and to rectify the failure of state statutes to mandate enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements.12   It was also enacted “to make 
arbitration a more viable option to parties weary of the ever–
increasing cost and delays of litigation.”13  Thus, there is ample 
  
 9. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).  
 10. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994).  Note that for the 
purposes of this part, the designation “FAA” will refer strictly to Sections 1–16 
of Title IX of the U.S. Code, rather than the current format of Title IX, which 
incorporates the New York Convention (in Chapter II) and the Inter–
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (in Chapter 
III).  For a full discussion of the reasons for this distinction, see infra Part 
IV.C. 
 11. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3A:04 (rev’d ed. 
2002).   
 12. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 
266 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1984). 
 13. See H.R. Rep No. 96, 68th Congress, 1st Sess. (1924). 
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evidence, that the FAA reflected a heavy pro–arbitration bias 
on the part of Congress from its very inception.14  Furthermore, 
it is also clear that this bias applied with particular force in the 
realm of international commerce, a point addressed in detail 
later in this Note.15   
However, the FAA accomplished more than simply establish-
ing a universally recognized right to arbitration.  The Act 
amounts to “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state 
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”16  Further-
more, the strong pro–arbitration language in the statute was 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to evince congressional in-
tent that “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion.”17  The Supreme Court’s decision in Allied–Bruce, in which 
the court upheld the position that the FAA extends to the full 
reach of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause, best 
illustrates the reason for this very expansive and highly defer-
ential view toward arbitration.18   
In defining the nature of arbitration under the FAA, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly emphasized that arbitration is a 
creature of contract.19  In recognizing the contractual nature of 
arbitration, the Supreme Court noted that the wishes of the 
parties must be respected even if at times the terms of the un-
derlying contract may work against some of the specific benefits 
  
 14. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 
U.S. 1 (1983). 
 15. See H.R. Rep. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970); See also Allied–
Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 265.  
 16. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Allied–Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 274.  The Court reached this 
conclusion by examining the language of the statute (“involving” commerce), 
and finding it to be the functional equivalent of “affecting.”  The Court contin-
ued by stating that when used in the phrase “affecting commerce,” this word 
or its equivalents evince “a congressional intent to exercise its Commerce 
Clause power to the full.”  Id. 
 19. See AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 
643, 648 (1986); see also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 
564, 570 (1960). 
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which arbitration grants.20  In the Court’s opinion, “the basic 
objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest 
manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes, ... but to 
ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other con-
tracts, are enforced according to their terms.   
B. The New York Convention 
Identical concerns regarding the viability of arbitration and 
the enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards eventually 
surfaced in the international context.  In these cases, however, 
matters were further complicated by the reluctance of parties to 
entrust the resolution of disputes to the judicial systems of their 
business partners’ home countries because of potential bias and 
lack of familiarity with foreign judicial systems.21  However, a 
fair and effective system of dispute resolution became a para-
mount need with increased international economic expansion 
and globalization of the world economies.   
In order to achieve this end, several international conven-
tions were drafted during the twentieth century.  The first such 
document was the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 
1923, followed by the Geneva Convention of 1927.   While these 
treaties were laudable first attempts at uniform rules of en-
forcement, they still contained serious deficiencies, such as pro-
visions placing the burden of proof on the party seeking en-
forcement of the arbitral award.22  Furthermore, the Convention 
  
 20. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995).  See 
also Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57 (holding that federal policy favors enforce-
ment of arbitration terms which the parties agreed to). 
 21. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1146 
(4th ed. 1999) (citing Nelson, Alternatives to Litigations of International Dis-
putes, 23 INT’L LAW 187 (1989)). 
 22. The two treaties referenced above failed to effectively meet the de-
mands of international commerce, and were thus unsuitable for the purposes 
desired by private actors.  For example, the Geneva Convention in Article I 
required signatory countries applying local rules to enforce awards made in 
other signatory countries.  However, the Geneva Convention did not apply to 
the enforcement of awards made in non–signatory countries, thus impeding 
the international enforceability of arbitral awards.  The New York Convention 
cured this defect in Article I(1) by extending its application to all awards for-
eign to the jurisdiction where enforcement of the award was sought.  How-
ever, the reservation in Article I(3) of the New York Convention allows coun-
tries to reserve the right, upon ratification of the Convention, to only apply 
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of 1927 lacked the expected impact on international dispute set-
tlement because neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
ratified it.23   The New York Convention followed in 1958, bring-
ing some much–needed improvements.  To date, one hundred 
and thirty–three countries, including the United States, have 
ratified the New York Convention.24   The New York Convention 
was designed to make enforcement of arbitral awards almost 
automatic; to a large extent, it has accomplished its goal.  
1. Legislative History 
The treaties in place before the New York Convention did not 
effectively mandate enforcement at the international level.  In 
1953, in order to remedy this situation, the International 
Chamber of Commerce submitted to the Secretary General of 
the UN a report and a preliminary draft convention to replace 
the previous treaties.25  The proposal was reviewed and revised 
by an ad–hoc committee of the UN Economic and Social Coun-
cil.  Additional revisions were made pursuant to the comments 
submitted by member governments of the UN, non–member 
governments and interested international organizations.   Fi-
nally, a conference on the subject was convened in New York.  
Working parties established at this conference made further 
amendment proposals, and the conference resulted in the Con-
vention in its current form.  The U.S. Congress ratified the New 
  
the Convention to awards rendered “in the territory of another Contracting 
State.”  Given the widespread ratification of the New York Convention, how-
ever, this point has become largely moot.  Also, the Geneva Convention con-
tained the requirement of double exequatur, which restricted a party from 
seeking enforcement of the award in another jurisdiction until the award was 
confirmed in the country of origin.  For a full discussion of the problem of dou-
ble exequatur see Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at 
Articles V and VII of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 54–55 (2002).   
 23. See PHILIPPE FOUCHARD ET AL., FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 122 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John 
Savage eds., 1999).  
 24. An up–to–date list can be found on the United Nations Commission for 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) web site, which is regularly updated 
as new information becomes available, see http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.ht 
m (last visited Sept. 25, 2003). 
 25. Report and Preliminary Draft Convention, U.N.Doc. E/2704 and Corr. 
(1958).  
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York Convention in 1970, and included it in the FAA in the 
same year by enacting Chapter II of Title Nine of the U.S. 
Code.26 
2. Public Policy Considerations 
The purpose of the New York Convention was “to encourage 
the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration 
agreements in international contracts, and to unify the stan-
dards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbi-
tral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.”27  The ten-
ets of the Convention constituted a major improvement over 
existing treaties. 
Chapter II of Title Nine implements the New York Conven-
tion, and provides as follows: Section 201 provides that the New 
York Convention “shall be enforced in United States courts in 
accordance with this chapter.”28  Section 203, in contrast with 
Chapter I of the FAA,29 confers subject matter jurisdiction on 
the federal courts for proceedings where parties seek enforce-
ment or review of arbitral awards under the New York Conven-
tion.30  Section 207 adopts the grounds for refusal or deferral of 
enforcement of awards from the Convention into the FAA.31  Fi-
nally, Section 208 establishes the relationship between the New 
York Convention and the former parts of the FAA.32  Thus, pur-
suant to principles of statutory interpretation, in cases where 
arbitral awards are sought to be enforced pursuant to the New 
York Convention (FAA Chapter II) or the Inter–American Con-
  
 26. H.R. Rep. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970). 
 27. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n15. 
 28. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). 
 29. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994). 
 30. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). In relevant part, this section provides that “An 
action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise 
under the laws and treaties of the United States.  The district courts of the 
United States ... shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or pro-
ceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy.”  See infra Part IV.C. for a 
further discussion of the issue of jurisdiction. 
 31. Provides that “the court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of 
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award 
specified in the [New York] Convention.”  9 U.S.C. § 207 (1994). 
 32. “Chapter I applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chap-
ter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Con-
vention as ratified by the United States.”  9 U.S.C. § 208 (1994). 
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vention on International Commercial Arbitration (FAA Chapter 
III), Chapter I serves only to fill in the gaps.33 
The New York Convention also contains some potentially in-
convenient provisions, but, as the widespread ratification of the 
Convention indicates, these provisions have not raised signifi-
cant hurdles.  Two potential problems arise from the reserva-
tions allowed to signatory states by Article I(3).34   First, the so–
called “reciprocity reservation” allows signatory states to de-
clare that they will apply the Convention only to awards ren-
dered in the territory of another contracting state.35  This reser-
vation initially increased the degree of uncertainty regarding 
the enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in non–signatory 
countries.   Given the widespread ratification of the Convention, 
however, this restriction has become almost entirely moot.36  
Secondly, the Convention allowed states to declare that they 
would only apply the Convention to “differences arising out of 
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are con-
sidered commercial under the national law of the State making 
such declaration.”37  This provision subjected the enforceability 
of foreign arbitral awards to a measure of domestic review in 
the country where enforcement is sought, by subjecting these 
awards to the domestic interpretation of the concept of “com-
merce.”  
The most attractive feature of the Convention lies in Article 
V, which lists the exclusive grounds for refusing recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards.  The grounds presented in Arti-
cle V are generally very clear, and provide a valuable frame-
work for actors in international commerce to structure their 
agreement so as to avoid denial of enforcement.   In relevant 
part, Article V provides: 
  
 33. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3A:04 (rev’d ed. 
2002).  (Referring to the principle of statutory interpretation stating that “the 
specific controls the general.”). 
 34. The United States has ratified the Convention but has maintained both 
reservations.  See UNCITRAL web site at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.ht 
m  for a complete list of reservations maintained by all signatory states. 
 35. See New York Convention Art. I(3), supra note 3. 
 36. See supra note 24. 
 37. See New York Convention Art. I(3), supra note 3. 
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1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be re-
fused...only if that party furnishes to the competent authority 
where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II 
were, under the law applicable to them, under some inca-
pacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to 
which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any indica-
tion thereon, under the law of the country where the 
award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not 
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or 
of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by 
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbi-
tration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be sepa-
rated from those not so submitted, that part of the award 
which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitra-
tion may be recognized and enforced; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbi-
tral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement 
of the parties, or failing such agreement, was not in accor-
dance with the law of the country where the arbitration 
took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, 
or has been set aside or suspended by a competent author-
ity of the country in which, or under the law of which, the 
award was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also 
be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country. 
The importance of the Article V provisions lies in their preci-
sion and their ability to restrict judicial interference to a limited 
number of scenarios.  Thus, paragraph one addresses potential 
grounds for review with regard to procedural problems.  In al-
File: DanMacro.doc Created on:  10/19/2003 8:41 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:36 PM 
324 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1  
lowing the losing party minimal recourse against enforcement 
of awards, this paragraph limits the grounds for review to a 
very narrow, defined set of circumstances.  Paragraph two, es-
pecially its latter provision, seems to expand the scope of possi-
bilities for invalidation, and works against the precision of the 
previous paragraph.  This dichotomy is not as strong as it might 
appear, however.  In the United States, for instance, in keeping 
with the pro–enforcement bias of the Convention, the language 
of paragraph (2)(b) was interpreted to apply only to cases jeop-
ardizing “the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and 
justice,” a very rigorous standard.38 
In contrast to the preceding two Geneva conventions, under 
the New York Convention the party advocating denial of en-
forcement bears the burden of proof.39  Furthermore, the lan-
guage of the Convention does not require that enforcement be 
denied if sufficient proof is presented.  Rather, it is permissive, 
granting the reviewing judge leeway to proceed with enforce-
ment in spite of the proof presented.40  Neither the New York 
Convention nor the FAA contemplate situations in which par-
ties contract to expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral 
awards.  Because of this omission the national courts have ad-
dressed this problem with mixed results, as the following sec-
tion will illustrate.  Unfortunately, as a result of the lack of 
statutory guidance or Supreme Court direction, the outcomes 
have not been as uniform in the U.S. domestic arena as one 
might hope. The federal appellate courts have reached different 
results based on differing levels of emphasis placed on institu-
tional integrity and the parties’ freedom of contract.   
  
 38. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Generale de 
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2nd Cir. 1974). 
 39. See supra Part I.B. (On the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 
1923 and the Geneva Convention of 1927). 
 40. See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V (The chapeau of Article 
V(1) provides that “Recognition and enforcement may be refused, at the re-
quest of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to 
the competent authority where recognition and enforcement is sought, 
proof....” (emphasis added)). 
File: DanMacro.doc Created on: 10/19/2003 8:41 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:36 PM 
2003] FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS 325 
II. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS AND UNDERLYING 
CONSIDERATIONS 
The tension that permeates the issue of expanded review of 
arbitral awards is evident from the sheer volume of scholarly 
articles that address the topic.41  Furthermore, the disparity in 
the decisions on this issue among the various districts speaks 
loudly as to the validity of both points of view in this debate.  
Given the lack of Supreme Court guidance, reasonable minds 
may disagree as to the legality of such expanded review.  Nev-
ertheless, this Note will contend that contractual expansion of 
judicial review is not only warranted, but indeed mandated, by 
the nature of the arbitral process and its underlying policy ob-
jectives.  The following sections will illustrate why the only out-
come consistent with long–standing public policy in the field of 
arbitration is the one allowing such expanded review.   
Several circuits have ruled on the issue of the legality of ex-
panded judicial review of domestic arbitral awards in recent 
years, and have arrived at opposing conclusions.42  The decisions 
of the various circuits have polarized around two main trains of 
thought.  The first is illustrated by decisions of the Seventh and 
Tenth Circuits, which have refused to allow expanded judicial 
review out of concern for the integrity of the judicial system.43  
  
 41. See, e.g., Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanding Scope of Jud- 
icial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1998); Kenneth 
M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judi-
cial Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337 (2000); 
Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Articles V and VII 
of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 43, 44 (2002); Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of 
the Law is No Excuse; Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 
49 (1997); James B. Hamlin, Contractual Alteration of the Scope of Judicial 
Review — The US Experience, 15 J. OF INT’L ARB. 47 (1998); Alan S. Rau, “Ar-
bitrability” and Judicial Review: A Brief Rejoinder, 13 WORLD ARB & 
MEDIATION REP. 71 (2002); Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope 
of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147 (1997); Kevin 
A. Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitra-
tion Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 
(2002); Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Re-
view of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241 (1999). 
 42. See supra note 8. 
 43. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); Chicago 
Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun–Times, 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
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The second viewpoint is exemplified by decisions of the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits, which have taken a freedom of contract ap-
proach and have chosen to move away from a restrictive inter-
pretation of statutory language, allowing expanded review of 
arbitration agreements.44 
In illustrating the arguments made by the various circuits, 
this paper will dissect the LaPine I decision of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in late 1997.45  This case provides an excellent 
example of the polarization of the various circuits, because the 
decision of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California (the “Northern District of California”) in 
La Pine Technology Corporation v. Kyocera Corporation46 aptly 
presents the arguments against expanded review, while the 
decision of the LaPine I panel illustrates the freedom of contract 
approach.   
A. The Institutional Integrity Model  
1. Underlying Considerations 
According to the institutional integrity viewpoint, expanded 
judicial review is impermissible because it intrudes into the 
court’s role as designated by statute.  The arguments raised by 
the scholars and the various courts in supporting this view, 
once cleansed of rhetorical discourse and fact–specific twists, 
can be summarized as follows: 
Institutional integrity advocates consider the role of the 
courts in reviewing arbitral awards immutable and strictly de-
fined.  They argue that Congress, by passing Title Nine of the 
U.S. Code, has provided a clear set of boundaries for the courts 
in reviewing both domestic and international arbitral awards.  
Therefore, if parties were allowed to ignore the statutes and 
draft their own rules as to judicial review, the role of the courts 
and the arbitration process would be negatively impacted in 
several significant ways.   
  
 44. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 
1997); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 
993 (5th Cir. 1995).  
 45. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d 884.  
 46. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F.Supp 697 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
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First, the courts would be asked to perform a review based on 
a standard agreed to by the parties, with which the reviewing 
courts may or may not be familiar.  Thus, requiring the courts 
to apply differing standards of review in every dispute would 
undermine the expected predictability of outcomes in award 
enforcement proceedings.  Such a scenario, it is argued, would 
give rise to concerns regarding potential injustice due to the 
differing interpretations which the various courts might give to 
standards of review fashioned by agreement between the par-
ties to the dispute.47  This concern was aptly expressed by Judge 
Kozinski in his concurring opinion in the LaPine I decision.48  
Secondly, the advantageous nature of arbitration would be 
damaged if the courts were to allow the parties to set the 
boundaries of judicial review by agreement.49  In performing this 
expanded review, courts would unnecessarily extend the dura-
tion, scope and expense of reaching a resolution to the dispute 
presented.  Such a process would diminish the qualities which 
make arbitration of disputes attractive, and significantly reduce 
the value of arbitration as an effective means of extra–judicial 
dispute resolution.  
Finally, the argument presented holds that expanded review 
would violate specific statutory provisions of the FAA.50  Such a 
course of action would impermissibly substitute the will of par-
ties to the arbitration in place of the will of the legislature, as 
expressed in the FAA.  Specifically, the institutional integrity 
advocates hold that the grounds for review mentioned in the 
FAA are the exclusive grounds available to a reviewing court in 
examining arbitral awards, and that congressional intent in 
this matter was to specifically preclude any review under differ-
ing, more expansive, standards.  These arguments were adopted 
by several federal appellate courts and were discussed in detail 
by the Northern District of California opinion in the LaPine 
case.51 
  
 47. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 543 
(1995) (Stevens J., dissenting). 
 48. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 891.   
 49. Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of 
Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 151 (1997). 
 50. Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1333 (Ill App. Ct. 
1982). 
 51. LaPine Tech., 909 F.Supp 697. 
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2. The Northern District of California Decision in 
LaPine Tech. v. Kyocera 
LaPine Technology Corporation (“LaPine”) was formed in 
1984 in order to design, market and share computer disk 
drives.52  Since it did not have the necessary facilities to manu-
facture these drives, LaPine entered into an agreement with 
Prudential Trade (a partnership the general partner of which 
was an affiliate of Prudential–Bache Trade Corporation) and 
Kyocera Corporation (“Kyocera”).53  The contemplated transac-
tion structure provided that Kyocera, acting as LaPine’s licen-
see, would manufacture the drives, and that financing for pro-
duction would be provided by Prudential Trade.54  Subsequent 
agreements were completed in 1985, outlining the structure of 
the transaction: LaPine would order the drives from Kyocera 
pursuant to a negotiated quantity and delivery schedule.  An-
other subsidiary of Prudential Trade would then purchase the 
product from Kyocera and resell it at a markup to Prudential 
Trade, which would finally sell it to LaPine on credit. 
In January 1986, LaPine, Kyocera and Prudential Trade, 
through its subsidiary KK PB Trade Corporation, (“KK Trade”), 
agreed to certain actions to be taken by the parties in 1986.55   
However, later that year Kyocera experienced severe production 
problems.  LaPine was in turn plagued by management prob-
lems, and failed to make payments to Prudential Trade, but 
still requested that Prudential Trade make payments to Kyo-
cera for product delivered by Kyocera.  Kyocera requested as-
surances that it would be paid for goods manufactured and 
shipped by it.56  Due to the impasse, a reorganization of LaPine 
became imperative in order to continue the production and sale 
of the disk drives, and several formulae were contemplated by 
the parties.57   
The agreed upon solution provided for a “merger” by which 
LaPine would become the wholly owned subsidiary of a newly 
formed LaPine Holding Company (“LaPine Holding”).  Two 
  
 52. Id. at 699. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 700. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
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thirds of LaPine Holding’s voting stock would be owned by Pru-
dential Trade and one third by Kyocera, in exchange for addi-
tional capital contributions by Prudential Trade and Kyocera.58  
An agreement detailing these arrangements was executed by all 
the parties on December 18, 1996.59  This Definitive Agreement 
provided that the parties bound themselves to present executed 
copies of various other, more specific, agreements, such as the 
Amended Trading Agreement, by the closing date.60  However, 
after signing the Definitive Agreement, Kyocera declined to sign 
the Amended Trading Agreement, which provided for a direct 
sale of the products from Kyocera to LaPine, without the inter-
vening sales to KK Trade and Prudential Trade, and notified its 
business partners of its refusal.61   On December 29, 1986, the 
closing date, counsel for LaPine and Prudential Trade notified 
Kyocera of its breach of the Definitive Agreement by reason of 
its failure to execute the Amended Trading Agreement.62  
In May 1987, LaPine sued in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, in an attempt to compel Kyocera to continue supplying 
drives under the terms of the Definitive Agreement.  Pursuant 
to the section of the Definitive Agreement regarding dispute 
resolution, Kyocera moved to compel arbitration, and the dis-
trict court granted the motion in September 2, 1987.63   The dis-
pute was submitted to arbitration before a panel of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, which found in favor of LaPine.64  
After the issuance of the arbitral award, La Pine moved to con-
firm the award under Chapter I of the FAA, the domestic arbi-
  
 58. Id.  
 59. The agreement (known as the Definitive Agreement) was executed by 
all parties, including Kyocera, and then filed with the California Corporations 
Commissioner in order to comply with California law regarding corporate 
reorganizations.  Id.  
 60. Id. at 701. 
 61. Kyocera’s counsel advised other parties that Kyocera would not sign 
the Amended Trading Agreement at a meeting on December 17 and 18, 1986.  
Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  Section 8.10(b) of the Definitive Agreement provided that “the arbi-
tration shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. sections 1 et seq.”  Id. 
 64. LaPine Tech., 909 F.Supp at 698. 
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tration statute.65  In turn Kyocera moved to vacate, modify and 
correct the award.  The crux of the dispute was contained in 
Section 8.10(d) of the Definitive Agreement, stating the role of 
the arbitrators and that of the federal court of first instance:  
The arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state 
the bases of the award and include detailed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California may enter judgment upon 
any award, either by confirming the award or by vacating, 
modifying or correcting the award.  The Court shall vacate, 
modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds 
referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbi-
trator’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evi-
dence, or (iii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are er-
roneous.66 
The significance of this paragraph as the bone of contention 
between these parties is plainly visible from the text of the 
agreement, as subsections (ii) and (iii) include grounds of review 
above and beyond those customary under the FAA.  Section (ii) 
explicitly asks the federal district court to review the arbitral 
award in light of the evidence presented.  Such review can pose 
significant problems, since arbitration proceedings rarely pro-
duce a record of the proceedings.67  Furthermore, the eviden-
tiary and disclosure rules of arbitral processes are tailored to 
the needs of the parties, and constitute a far cry from the rigors 
of litigation.68  Thus, a review of the factual support of the arbi-
tral award invites extensive debate over the veracity and com-
prehensiveness of the facts presented.  Moreover, the “sup-
ported by substantial evidence” standard agreed to by the par-
ties is sufficiently vague to allow for a wide range of approaches 
by the reviewing court.  Section (iii) invites judicial review of 
the arbitrator’s conclusions of law.  This process can also be dif-
ficult and likely to give rise to extensive debate, because in most 
  
 65. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994).  It is unclear to this author why LaPine did 
not opt to seek enforcement of the award under the New York Convention, 
since the award in this case clearly qualified as “foreign” within the meaning 
of the statute. 
 66. Id.  
 67. RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14 (2000). 
 68. Id. 
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cases arbitrators do not render opinions detailing their inter-
pretation and application of the law.69  Furthermore, arbitrators 
are not always obligated to follow the law very closely in render-
ing a decision, but rather are granted wide powers to decide the 
dispute before them in accordance with general principles of 
fairness, equity and justice.70  Thus, the combined language of 
these provisions in fact almost mandated de novo review by the 
Northern District of California. 
In deciding the case, the court discussed several issues, but 
acknowledged that the central issue of the case was the validity 
of the scope of review clause.  In support of its pro–enforcement 
position, Kyocera made several arguments based on previous 
decisions on the subject.  However, the Northern District of 
California was not persuaded, and chose to follow the language 
of Seventh Circuit opinion in Chicago Typographical, and to 
take a restrictive institutional integrity approach to the case.71   
In Chicago Typographical, the union representing the com-
posing–room employees of both the Chicago Sun–Times (the 
“Sun–Times”) and the Chicago Tribune (the “Tribune”) had 
signed a collective bargaining agreement with the Tribune.72  In 
reliance on a clause in its own agreement with the union which 
entitled the Sun–Times to any concessions the union granted 
the Tribune, the Sun–Times subsequently changed some of the 
terms and conditions of employment in its composing room.73  
The matter was submitted to arbitration by the union, with a 
mixed result.74  In early 1990 the union filed suit in federal dis-
trict court challenging the arbitral award, based on Section 301 
of the Taft–Hartley Act, creating federal jurisdiction over suits 
to enforce labor contracts.75  The district court upheld the arbi-
tral award, and the union appealed to the Seventh Circuit.  
Judge Posner began his discussion on behalf of the Seventh 
Circuit by stating that the role of the courts was not “to review 
the soundness of arbitration awards, [because] agreement to 
  
 69. See Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1506.   
 70. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 67, at 26. 
 71. Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d 1501. 
 72. Id. at 1503. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  The arbitrator found that some of the changes were authorized by 
the “most favored nation” clause, and that some were not.  Id. 
 75. Id. 
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submit a dispute ... to arbitration is a contractual commitment 
to abide by the arbitrator’s interpretation.”76  Thus, the court 
recognized the possibility that parties could resort to an appel-
late arbitration panel to review an arbitrator’s award.77  But the 
Seventh Circuit then went on to categorically deny the possibil-
ity of federal judicial review of that award, by stating: “they [the 
parties] cannot contract for judicial review of that award: fed-
eral jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.”78  In support of 
its holding, the opinion went on to state that the court was not 
allowed to “substitute its own interpretation even if convinced 
that the arbitrator’s interpretation was not only wrong, but 
plainly wrong.”79  Judge Posner further explained that in–depth 
scrutiny of arbitrator opinions would be detrimental, because it 
might discourage arbitrators from writing opinions at all.80  The 
court reasoned that while arbitrators were not required to write 
opinions, the practice of doing so was very beneficial, as “writ-
ing disciplines thought,” and therefore the courts should not 
“create disincentives for their doing so.”81  This, however, is as 
far as the Seventh Circuit opinion went in, undoubtedly 
obliquely, speaking to the issue of expanded review of arbitral 
awards.   
First, it is important to note that the entire discussion men-
tioned above is dicta, as expanded judicial review was not an 
issue before the Seventh Circuit in that instance, and therefore 
the precedential value of the opinion is limited.82   As the LaPine 
I panel later correctly noted, there was no indication that the 
parties had bestowed appellate jurisdiction upon the Seventh 
Circuit, nor had they asked the reviewing court to utilize some 
unfamiliar standard of review.83  Second, in cases involving in-
ternational arbitration awards, the federal courts undoubtedly 
have subject matter jurisdiction by explicit statutory authoriza-
  
 76. Id. at 1504–05. 
 77. Id. at 1505. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1506. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Tom Cullinan, Contracting for An Expanded Scope of Judicial Review 
in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395, 407 (1998).   
 83. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 889–90. 
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tion.84  Third, the Chicago Typographical decision failed to ad-
dress the issue squarely, since neither of the parties in this case 
asked the court to expand the scope of its involvement.  Never-
theless, relying on the reasoning in the Seventh Circuit dicta, 
the Northern District of California held that where federal ju-
risdiction was clearly established, and the guidelines for review 
were provided by statute, the extent of review could not be al-
tered by contractual understandings among the parties.  
Since the Northern District of California decision in LaPine, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also addressed the issue 
of expanded review of arbitral awards in Bowen v. Amoco Pipe-
line Company, and has also refused to uphold expanded review, 
becoming the first federal court of appeals to explicitly do so.85  
In 1998 the Bowens filed suit against Amoco in tort and breach 
of contract.  Amoco’s pipeline, which extended over the Bowens’ 
property pursuant to an easement agreement, had been found 
to be leaking by an investigation of the Oklahoma Corporate 
Commission.  Amoco moved to compel arbitration pursuant to 
the easement agreement which had been executed by both par-
ties’ predecessors in interest.  The Bowens and Amoco agreed to 
arbitration, provided that the scope of judicial review of the ar-
bitral award would be enlarged.86  Specifically, the reviewing 
court had the power to review the award “on the grounds that 
the award was not supported by the evidence.”87  The arbitrator 
found for the Bowens, and they filed a motion for confirmation 
of the award.88  Amoco simultaneously filed a motion to vacate 
the award, as well as a notice of appeal of the arbitration award 
pursuant to the modified arbitration rules.89  The lower court 
refused to apply the expanded review of the arbitration clause, 
and confirmed the award.90  
In a unanimous decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion of the lower court.91  The appellate court offered only a curt 
  
 84. See infra, Part IV.C. 
 85. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).  
 86. Id. at 930. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
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nod to the decisions of the Fourth,92 Fifth and Ninth Circuits, 
and chose to disregard their holdings.93  The Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed with these courts, stating that the Supreme Court lan-
guage they invoked did not specifically address the issue of par-
ties’ interference with the judicial process.  Specifically, the 
Tenth Circuit looked to the underlying policy of the FAA, and 
held that the widespread support for arbitration was a result of 
the fact that it provided an expeditious and cheap method of 
dispute resolution.  Thus, the opinion stressed the speed and 
cost–effectiveness of arbitration and found that these attributes 
must trump any agreement of the parties which would diminish 
them.  As mentioned above, however, the Ninth Circuit subse-
quently reversed the decision of the Northern District of Cali-
fornia in LaPine I, and instead emphasized the freedom of con-
tract approach. 
B. The Freedom of Contract Model 
1. Underlying Considerations 
Freedom of contract proponents view this dilemma of ex-
panded review from a slightly different perspective.  In their 
opinion, the foremost feature which attracts parties to arbitra-
tion as an option for effective dispute resolution is not the expe-
ditiousness and cost–effectiveness of the process, but rather the 
ability to have the dispute resolved within a framework which 
the parties themselves can establish by agreement, and the 
ability to have their wishes enforced by the courts.  Thus, al-
though speed of resolution and significant reduction in expenses 
are significant advantages, they lose their luster if imposed 
paternalistically by a rigid judicial system and an inflexible leg-
islature.  In other words, substituting the formalistic, proce-
dure–laden system of in–court litigation with another structure 
of dispute resolution which, while somewhat cheaper and faster, 
still takes the decision–making ability away from the parties 
with regard to key issues, is contrary to the fundamental pre-
  
 92. In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit court joined the Fifth 
Circuit, concluding that the district court should have applied the expanded 
standard of review agreed to by the parties.  See Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLe-
land, 120 F.3d 262, (4th Cir. 1997). 
 93. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933. 
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cepts of arbitration.  After all, arbitration, along with other al-
ternative dispute resolution methods, was intended to allow 
parties to circumvent the strictures of litigation by designing a 
resolution process fitted to their specific needs.94  While the ju-
dicial system can not be circumvented entirely, because awards 
still need judicial sanction in order to be enforced, the exposure 
to potential unexpected results at the review level was mini-
mized by the legislature through enactment of the FAA, and by 
the international community by enactment of the New York 
Convention.  However, proponents of the freedom of contract 
model argue that there is no indication that these documents 
were intended to thwart the wishes of the parties to arbitration 
to do so. 
2. The Ninth Circuit Decision in LaPine I95 
Subsequent to the district court decision, Kyocera appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The 
Ninth Circuit reached a decision on the matter in December 
1997.96  The three–judge panel was divided on the outcome of 
the case, with each of the judges on the panel submitting an 
opinion.  The opinions of Judges Fernandez, Kozinski and 
Mayer will be discussed in turn. 
The majority opinion97, written by Judge Fernandez, identi-
fied the major issue of the case: “Is federal court review of an 
arbitration agreement necessarily limited to the grounds set 
forth in the FAA or can the court apply greater scrutiny, if the 
parties have so agreed?”98  The majority agreed with Kyocera in 
finding that parties could, by agreement, stipulate to expand 
judicial review of arbitration decisions.99  In reaching this con-
clusion, the court departed from the rule it had announced in 
Todd Shipyards, which held that in the absence of contractual 
terms with respect to judicial review, a federal court could va-
cate or modify arbitral awards only if the respective award ex-
  
 94. Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 51 (1997). 
 95. See LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d 884. 
 96. Id. 
 97. As will be pointed out, the deciding vote of Judge Kozinski offered only 
reserved support to the majority position. 
 98. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 887. 
 99. Id. at 888. 
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hibited a manifest disregard for the law, was completely irra-
tional, or otherwise fell within one of the grounds enumerated 
in 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 or 11.100  
The deciding factor in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was the 
Supreme Court’s Volt Info. Sciences decision.101  In Volt, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court had 
reiterated “the FAA’s primary purpose of ensuring that private 
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their 
terms.”102  In deferring to congressional intent, the Supreme 
Court held that the FAA does not prevent enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate under rules different from those set out 
in the FAA.103   In further defining the approach which courts 
should adopt in reviewing arbitration agreements, the Court 
stated that “arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, 
not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their 
arbitration agreements as they see fit.”104  
Judge Fernandez then addressed, but explicitly declined to 
follow, the Seventh Circuit’s Chicago Typographical opinion, 
arguing that the Seventh Circuit had not explained “what had 
evoked that pronouncement, nor did it further explain the rea-
soning behind it.”105  The majority explained that the Chicago 
Typographical opinion had not indicated that the parties in the 
  
 100. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 
(9th Cir. 1991).  Beside the “manifest disregard” and “completely irrational” 
standard, the FAA also allows vacatur of an award procured by corruption, 
fraud or undue means, where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone hearings, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy, and, finally, where the arbi-
trators exceeded their powers or used them so imperfectly so that a mutual, 
final and definite award was not rendered on the subject matter. See Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1924).  Furthermore, the FAA allows federal 
courts to modify or correct an award where there was evident material miscal-
culation or an evident material mistake in a description of a person or thing, 
where the arbitrators awarded on matter not submitted to them, or where the 
award is imperfect in of form not affecting the controversy. See Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1924). 
 101. See Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
Jr. University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 102. Id. at 478. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 479. 
 105. La Pine Tech., 130 F. 3d at 889–90. 
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action had intended to bestow “appellate jurisdiction” on that 
court, nor had that opinion indicated that the parties had asked 
the court to utilize some “exotic” standard of review.106  In light 
of these considerations, the Ninth Circuit opted to treat the 
“cryptic assertion” of the Seventh Circuit as dicta.107  Instead, 
the majority chose to follow the prescription of the Supreme 
Court, holding that there is an “established principle that the 
FAA is a regulation of commerce rather than a limitation on or 
conferral of federal court jurisdiction.”108 
In reaching its decision, the LaPine I majority also relied on 
the precedent set by the Fifth Circuit in Gateway Technologies 
v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.109  In Gateway the Fifth Cir-
cuit had held that the provisions of the FAA could be super-
seded by terms of the contract because the contractual provi-
sions arose from the agreement of the parties.110  MCI had won a 
bid for a contract with the Virginia Department of Corrections, 
which it then subcontracted to Gateway.111  The contract with 
Gateway called for dispute resolution by arbitration, stipulat-
ing, however, that “errors of law shall be subject to appeal.”112  
Pursuant to a dispute over the design of the system, the con-
tract with Gateway was terminated, and arbitral proceedings 
ensued.  The arbitrator found MCI to have breached the con-
tract.   Gateway moved to confirm the award, and MCI moved 
to vacate the district court decision confirming the award.113  
The Fifth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court decision in 
Volt in approving of the enlarged scope of judicial review em-
bodied in the parties’ agreement.114  The court held that “be-
cause these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial re-
view, their contractual provision supplements the FAA’s default 
standard of review and allows for de novo review of issues of 
law.”115  The court also explicitly stated that it would uphold ex-
  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Allied–Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 269. 
 109. See Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir., 
1995). 
 110. Id. at 996–97. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. (discussing Art. 9 of the contract between Gateway and MCI). 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 997. 
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panded judicial review even if doing so would in effect “sacrifice 
the simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration on the 
altar of appellate  review.”116  The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the intent of the parties trumps, because “federal arbitration 
policy demands that the court conduct its review according to 
the terms of the arbitration agreement.”117  
Finally, in addressing the loss of efficiency argument with re-
spect to enlarged judicial review, the Ninth Circuit cited argu-
ments which the Southern District of New York had found to be 
persuasive in a previous case.118  In Fils, the Southern District 
had discussed the efficiency issue, and concluded that even with 
the enlarged review the resulting inquiry is “far less searching 
and time–consuming than a full trial” and therefore approved of 
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards in spite of the loss 
of speed and cost–effectiveness.119 
The La Pine I dissent adopted and reiterated the arguments 
of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Typographical in refusing 
expansion of judicial review.120  Judge Mayer’s opinion recog-
nized that parties were free to contractually agree to the proce-
dures to be followed during the arbitration process.  However, 
he insisted, the appellants had cited no authority explicitly au-
thorizing them to dictate how an Article III court was to review 
an arbitration decision.121  Consequently, if the parties wished 
more expansive scrutiny than granted under the FAA, they 
could agree to appellate review of an arbitration decision by 
another arbitration panel.122  They could not, however, stipulate 
by agreement to expanded judicial review of their initial arbi-
tration award.123  
Judge Kozinski, the third judge sitting on the LaPine I panel, 
was somewhat reserved in his concurrence with the majority 
opinion, and found the question presented was not one that 
  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Fils et Cables D’Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F.Supp 
240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 119. Id. at 244. 
 120. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 891. 
 121. Id.. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.. 
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could elicit an easy answer.124   He accurately noted that the 
quoted Supreme Court cases failed to address the specific issue 
at the center of the dispute.125  His objection was specifically ad-
dressed to the “different work” which the federal courts could be 
required to perform under the text of such an agreement for 
expanded review, work that might not be authorized by Con-
gress.126  Nevertheless, Judge Kozinski joined the majority opin-
ion, because the standard of review stipulated by the parties’ 
agreement was identical to the one used by federal courts in 
appeals from administrative agencies or bankruptcy court deci-
sions.127  In the judge’s opinion, given the strong policy favoring 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, Congress would proba-
bly approve of the court’s decision.  And while this did not con-
stitute “express congressional authorization ..., given the Arbi-
tration Act’s policy, it’s probably enough.”128   
Pursuant to the LaPine I decision, the case was remanded to 
the Northern District of California.129  The Northern District 
confirmed the award of the arbitration panel, and Kyocera Cor-
poration appealed, without disputing the issue of expanded re-
view.  On re–appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of 
the lower court, as well as the award of damages.130  However, in 
an interesting twist, a majority of the non–recused regular ac-
tive judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently voted 
to re–hear the case en banc, and pursuant to the rules of the 
  
 124. Id. (Kozinski J., concurring) (stating that he found the issue before the 
court “closer than most”). 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  In Judge Kozinski’s words:  
Nevertheless I conclude that we must enforce the arbitration agree-
ment according to its terms.  The review ... is no different from that 
performed by the district courts in appeals from administrative agen-
cies and bankruptcy courts ... .  I would call the case differently if the 
agreement provided that the district judge would review the award 
by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.  
Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Kyocera Corporation v. Prudential–Bache Trade Services, Inc. et. al., 
299 F.3d 769 (2002) [hereinafter LaPine II]. 
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court131 an order to that effect was entered by Chief Judge Mary 
M. Schroeder.132  Prior to the en banc hearing the Ninth Circuit 
received additional briefing on the issue of whether private par-
ties may contractually bind a federal court to apply a less defer-
ential standard of review than the standard specified in the 
FAA.133  On August 29, 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued a deci-
sion, reversing the three–judge panel decision in LaPine I.  Al-
though Kyocera set forth over twenty–five grounds to vacate or 
correct the decision of the arbitral panel, and explicitly declined 
to address expanded review, the Ninth Circuit considered the 
issue of expanded review as dispositive of the case.  In raising 
the issue sua sponte, the court held that Congress, through the 
FAA, had provided the exclusive grounds of review of arbitral 
decisions.  The arguments raised by the Ninth Circuit in sup-
port of its reversal, are identical to those raised by Judge Pos-
ner in Chicago Typographical, and state that while parties may 
dictate the rules regarding the arbitration proceedings them-
selves, they may not establish the ground rules of judicial re-
view.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit recently aligned itself with the 
Seventh, Eighth and Tenth circuits in denying expanded re-
view, without raising any new arguments in support of its posi-
tion.   
The ultimate outcome of the case is irrelevant for purposes of 
this Note, because the arguments made by the majority in LaP-
ine I remain just as valid, and until the Supreme Court ad-
dresses the issue, the problem remains unresolved.  The out-
come is of some importance to practitioners, however, because 
the circuits have reached different conclusions on this issue, 
and thus identical proceedings would yield different outcomes 
depending on the circuit in which they were brought. 
III. RESPONSES OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
The views of foreign jurisdictions on the issue of expanded ju-
dicial review do not necessarily carry a lot of weight in U.S. 
  
 131. Circuit Rule 35–3, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Docu 
ments.nsf/FRAP+and+ Circuit+Rules?OpenView.htm. 
 132. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc. et al., 314 F.3d 
1003 (2002).   
 133. Kyocera Corporation v. Prudential–Bache Trade Services, Inc., et al., 
2003 WL 22025130, at 5 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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courts.  However, it is important to observe how various coun-
tries, some with a legal system very similar to our own, have 
chosen to resolve this issue, given the above mentioned goal of 
the Convention, namely uniformity in enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.134 
A. UNCITRAL Model Law 
Before delving into an analysis of the various legislative 
frameworks of other major actors in the field of international 
commercial arbitration, it is important to take a brief look at 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion (the “Model Law”).135  The reason for this preliminary ex-
amination is that the Model Law has served as a blueprint for 
many of the legislative acts which created the modern national 
arbitration frameworks, and in some cases, the Model Law has 
simply been adopted by the respective nations.136  Article 5 re-
flects one of the most important objectives of the Model Law, 
limiting the interference of national courts in the arbitral proc-
ess, by specifically holding that courts could intervene only in 
specific circumstances.137  The language of Article 5 seems to 
unequivocally prohibit interference by the courts in situations 
not specifically listed in its provisions, and also seems to ex-
clude any residual powers which the courts may have had.138  
Further clarifying the standards of review, Articles 34 and 36 of 
the Model Law provide the list of criteria for review of arbitral 
determinations, largely based on Article V of the New York 
Convention.139  The intent to specifically curtail the involvement 
of the courts is further confirmed by the legislative history of 
  
 134. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15. 
 135. UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration, UNICTRAL 
Model Law, available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.  Thus far 39 
countries have enacted laws based on the UNCITRAL Model.  Id. 
 136. Vikram Raghavan, Heightened Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: 
Perspectives from the UNCITRAL Model Law and the English Arbitration Act 
of 1996 on Some US Developments, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 103, 123 (1998). 
 137. See Model Law, supra note 135, art. 5. 
 138. Id. (stating “In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene 
except where so provided in this Law.”).  
 139. See Model Law, supra note 135, art. 34 and 36 (Art. 34 states that an 
application to set aside is the only recourse against an arbitral award and Art. 
36 lists the exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement). 
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Articles 34 and 36, which reveals that after extensive debate of 
additional proposals, the drafters agreed to limit the grounds of 
review to only those mentioned in the New York Convention.140 
Thus, it would seem that under the UNCITRAL Model Law 
contractually expanded judicial review would not be available, 
given the very restrictive language of Articles 5, 34 and 36.  
However, the Model Law is not binding, rather it only consti-
tutes a guide for national legislation, and one which has been 
adopted by countries around the world with varying degrees of 
alteration.141  One alternative to the Model Law is provided by 
the English Arbitration Act of 1996. 
B. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (“U.K.”) is one of the foremost centers of 
international commercial arbitration, and has a long–standing 
tradition of accepting arbitration as a valid means of dispute 
resolution, dating back to as early as the 17th century.142  The 
current arbitration law framework in the U.K. was established 
by the entry into force of the Arbitration Act of 1996 (the “Arbi-
tration Act”).143  The Arbitration Act aligned the country’s legis-
lation with the modern standards in arbitration law, and while 
it did not derive from the UNCITRAL Model Law, the influ-
ences of the Model Law are certainly visible.  The Arbitration 
Act generally establishes the same regime for both domestic 
and international awards, but maintains certain specific provi-
sions pertaining solely to recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.144  Specifically, Section 1 of the Arbitration Act 
lays out the “founding principles” pertaining to the construction 
of Part I of the law, and states that in matters covered by Part 
I, the court should not intervene except as provided within the 
Part.145  In this respect, Section 1 of the Arbitration Act strongly 
  
 140. See Raghavan, supra note 136, at 125–26 (citing HOWARD M. 
HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 912–15 (1989)). 
 141. Id at 125 n.87, 126 n.92 (discussing changes made by Australia, Singa-
pore, New Zealand, Egypt, Hong Kong, etc.).   
 142. HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV PECHOTA, NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAWS, UK A–
1 (2002).  
 143. Id. at UK A–2.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Raghavan, supra note 136, at 131.  
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resembles Article 5 of the Model Law.  Article 103 of the Arbi-
tration Act covers awards sought to be enforced pursuant to the 
New York Convention.146  Under this section, recognition or en-
forcement of these awards may not be refused except in a speci-
fied number of cases, based largely on the grounds set forth by 
the New York Convention, and which are considered to be ex-
haustive.147   
However, one major departure from the Model Law is embod-
ied in Section 69 of the Arbitration Act.   This section allows the 
parties to arbitration to bring an appeal on questions of law 
arising from an arbitration award.148  If, however, the parties 
agree otherwise, this right to appeal is precluded, and a chal-
lenge may be raised only under the grounds specifically listed in 
Section 68 of the Arbitration Act.149  Thus, under English Law, 
the parties to the arbitration can agree prior to the dispute 
whether the English courts will have the power to review the 
arbitral award on issues of law.  In this respect, England’s Arbi-
tration Act has parted in a significant way with the precepts of 
the Model Law.  Thus, nowadays England offers parties to arbi-
tration the possibility to expand judicial review beyond the 
grounds listed in the New York Convention, provided enforce-
ment is not sought under the New York Convention, but rather 
under Articles 68 and 69 of the Arbitration Act. 
C. France 
The host nation of the International Chamber of Commerce, 
France, plays a leading role in the development and advance-
ment of international commercial arbitration.  Furthermore, the 
French legal system tends to be very similar to the U.S. system 
with respect to the approach to international arbitration.  Like 
the U.S., France shares a policy of favoring arbitration, has ex-
tensive case law on enforcement of arbitral awards, and gives 
great deference to party autonomy in the arbitration process.150  
  
 146. Id. at 133. 
 147. Id. 
 148. James B. Hamlin, Contractual Alteration of the Scope of Judicial Re-
view — The US Experience, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 46 (1998). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Laurence Franc, Contractual Modification of Judicial Review of Arbi-
tral Awards: The French Position, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 215, 216 (1999). 
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However, unlike courts in the United States, French courts 
have not thus far been asked to decide whether to give effect to 
arbitration agreements expanding ulterior judicial review.151 
In spite of this situation, scholars have argued that even if 
presented with the issue, the French courts would most likely 
decline enforcement of such an agreement.152  The main reason 
for this assertion lies in the nature of the French provisions 
governing judicial review of such awards.  The Decree of 1980 
reformed the provisions regarding French domestic arbitration 
and became part of the New Code of Civil Procedure (“NCPC”) 
through the addition of Articles 1442 to 1491.153  The Decree of 
1981 completed the picture by adding Articles 1492 to 1507 to 
the NCPC, provisions specifically applicable to international 
arbitration.154  Overall, these reforms have had a positive impact 
on French arbitration law.  Since the enactment of the new 
NCPC provisions, the Paris Court of Appeals has developed a 
liberal stance toward arbitration agreements, arbitral proce-
dure, the substance of awards made abroad, and towards the 
removal of international arbitrations from the effects of choice 
of law rules and national legal systems, within the limits of in-
ternational public policy.155 
Both decrees contain very specific provisions for setting aside 
arbitral awards, listed in NCPC Articles 1484 and 1502 respec-
tively, and make it abundantly clear that the setting aside of an 
arbitral award is available only in those cases.156  Thus, should 
parties invoke any other grounds,157 the reviewing court will 
simply not take those grounds into consideration because, quite 
  
 151. Id. at 218. 
 152. Id.   
 153. Decree no. 80–354 of May 14, 1980, J.O., May 18, 1980; 1980 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 725.  
 154. Decree no. 81–500 of May 12, 1981, J.O., May 14, 1981; 1981 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 317.  
 155. See FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 68. 
 156. Franc, supra note 150, at 216–17; FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 
916. 
 157. See Société GL Outillage c/ Soc. Stankoimport, CA de Paris 1e civ., July 
10, 1992, REV. ARB. 1994, 142, note P. Level (Paris Court of Appeal refused to 
take into account the lack of jurisdiction of the Paris court); Southern Pacific 
Properties Ltd. c/ Republique Arabe d’Egypte, Cass. 1e civ., Jan. 6, 1987, REV. 
ARB. 1987, 468 (Cour de Cassation held that the mission of the Court of Ap-
peals was to examine the grounds enumerated in Article 1502 of the NCPC).  
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literally, they are not “on the list.”158  Nevertheless, as men-
tioned above, this proposition has not yet been tested in the 
context of a pre–dispute agreement to expand judicial review.159  
However, a recent decision of the Cour de Cassation on a simi-
lar issue seems to indicate that should the situation arise, the 
French courts would decline to grant the desired expanded re-
view.  In Soc. Buzicchelli Holding v.  Hennion, the French high 
court held that the freedom of contract of the parties does not 
grant them the power to create a means of recourse, which is 
not available under French law applicable to international 
awards.160   
D. Germany 
The recent reform of the German Code of Civil Procedure 
(“ZPO”) was long in the making since no major revisions of the 
ZPO had been undertaken since 1879.161  The changes enacted 
in 1997 reformed German arbitration law completely.  The new 
Book X of the ZPO is essentially based on the 1985 UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, and does 
not distinguish, in principle, between domestic and interna-
tional arbitration.162  Unlike the Model Law, however, the new 
law is not restricted to “commercial” arbitration, but instead 
governs all arbitrations.163 
Similar to the French NCPC, the German statute provides a 
definite and exclusive list of grounds on which an award may be 
challenged.164  Thus, in Germany as in France, expanded review 
of arbitral decisions is probably not available even if parties had 
contracted for it. 
  
 158. Franc, supra note 150, at 217. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Franc, supra note 150, at 218 (citing the Cour de Cassation decision in 
Société Buzicchelli Holding c/ Hennion et autres, Cass. 1e civ., Apr. 6, 1994, 
REV. ARB. 1995, 263, note P. Level). 
 161. FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 75. 
 162. Id. 
 163. SMIT & PECHOTA, supra note 142, at GER A–2. 
 164. Id. at GER B(2)–15 (translation of ZPO Chapter VII, Sections 1059 (2) 
and (3)). 
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E. Belgium 
In order to accommodate and encourage the development of 
international arbitration in Belgium, in 1985 this country re-
vised Article 1717 of its Code Judiciaire.165  The revision consti-
tutes a major development in the area of international arbitra-
tion, due to its rather drastic character.166  Specifically, para-
graph 4 of Article 1717 completely denies Belgian courts the 
authority to review international awards where the parties are 
non–Belgian, even if the situs of the arbitration was Belgium.167  
As a result, non–Belgian parties to international arbitration can 
no longer bring set–aside proceedings, even where there is clear 
evidence that the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal acted 
fraudulently or ultra vires.168  This provision is clearly revolu-
tionary, and has in effect turned Belgium into an “arbitration 
nirvana” for those who are most interested in finality when 
submitting disputes to arbitration.169   
However, while the Code Judiciaire now precludes the use of 
judicial review as a sword in setting aside a foreign award, it 
still allows for its use as a shield to defend against enforce-
ment.170   This situation raises the question of whether the New 
York Convention is applicable to foreign awards not subject to 
review at the seat of arbitration.171  It has been argued that such 
awards have an “anational” character, and therefore the Con-
vention does not apply.172   If that were the case, there would be 
no reason why courts would refuse to implement the scope of 
judicial review desired by the parties.  The reason for the previ-
ous assertion is the fact that the Convention contemplates judi-
  
 165. See Okeke, supra note 6, at 44. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Jay R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public 
Policy Checks on United States and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of 
Control?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1661, 1686 (1991). 
 168. Okeke, supra note 6, at 44–45, (citing Lee D. Neumann, Limiting Judi-
cial Review in International Commercial Arbitration: The New Swiss and 
Belgian Laws Offer Less Than They Promise, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 442–
47 (1991)). 
 169. Id. at 45. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Neumann, supra note 168, at 447.   
 172. Okeke, supra note 6, at 45. 
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cial review of the award at the arbitral situs, but does not man-
date such a review.173 
Thus, an arbitral award is binding under the New York Con-
vention even if review is precluded at the situs of the arbitra-
tion.174  Some commentators have argued that, while limiting 
the scope of review may be a desirable method of ensuring the 
finality of the arbitral process, eliminating review altogether, as 
in this case, may be a troublesome proposition.175   The fear ex-
pressed is that such provisions may transform the arbitration 
process into an arbitrary proposition, thus deterring business 
actors from opting for it as a means of effective dispute resolu-
tion.176   The statute forces parties to seek judicial review during 
enforcement proceedings, which generally happen in the coun-
try of one of the parties, thus raising the possibility of bias and 
subverting one of the main advantages of international arbitra-
tion, neutrality of the forum.177  By completely precluding the 
power of its courts to review the types of awards described 
above, Belgium has effectively barred any possibility of ex-
panded judicial review.  The most troubling aspect of preclusion 
of judicial review at situs of arbitration is that it does not result 
from the choice of the parties to the arbitration, but rather it is 
imposed by the legislature.   
F. Switzerland  
Similar to the U.K. and France, Switzerland is a very popular 
situs for arbitration proceedings because Swiss law grants the 
parties “almost complete autonomy in selecting arbitrators, 
choosing applicable law, and determining rules for the arbitral 
procedure.”178  With respect to judicial review of foreign arbitral 
awards, Switzerland adopted legislation that is different from 
the laws applicable to its domestic disputes, when it enacted 
  
 173. See New York Convention, supra note 3, Art. V(1)(e); Neumann, supra 
note 168, at 448.  See also Sever, supra note 167, at 1661, 1690.  
 174. William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding 
Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 707 
(1989) (“The place of the arbitration gives the arbitrator’s decision a presump-
tive validity in any of the countries that have ratified the Convention.”).     
 175. Okeke, supra note 6, at 45. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. SMIT & PECHOTA, supra note 142, at SWI A–1. 
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Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law Act, entitled 
“International Arbitration.”179  The provisions enacted in Chap-
ter 12 are very similar to previously mentioned legislative 
frameworks, but are of a more moderate vintage.  Article 190 
lists the exclusive grounds for non–recognition of an award.  
However, Article 192 of the same law expressly allows parties 
to agree whether or not to exclude any means of recourse 
against the award, or to limit their recourse to one of the 
grounds of Article 190.180  It is important to mention that Article 
192 applies only to instances where none of the parties to the 
arbitration has its domicile, residence, or principal place of 
business in Switzerland.181  
Thus, Article 190 of the Swiss law seems similar to the 
French law on judicial review of awards, allowing it only in a 
limited and specific number of situations.  The provisions of Ar-
ticle 192, granting parties the option of foreclosing review al-
most entirely, seems to reflect a policy similar to the one ad-
vanced by the Belgian parliament.  Thus, while a more restric-
tive form of review is available to parties to arbitration under 
Swiss law, expansion of judicial review is also seemingly un-
available. 
IV. ANALYSIS  
The validity of contractual expansion of judicial review re-
mains to be settled by the United States Supreme Court, if and 
when the Court chooses to address it.  In the meantime, this 
Note has attempted to illustrate the results achieved by the 
various U.S. districts and several foreign jurisdictions in re-
viewing the issue.  The U.S. cases present the two main trains 
of thought.  The first, the so–called institutional integrity ap-
proach, is illustrated by the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Ninth 
Circuit decisions, which categorically deny parties to arbitration 
the ability to contractually influence court review of arbitration 
awards.  The two main arguments advanced in support of this 
proposition, as illustrated above, are the concerns regarding 
subject matter jurisdiction, as a practical matter, and the integ-
rity of the judicial process, as a policy argument.  The second 
  
 179. Id. at SWI B(1)–1. 
 180. Franc, supra note 150, at 221. 
 181. Id. at 222. 
File: DanMacro.doc Created on: 10/19/2003 8:41 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:36 PM 
2003] FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS 349 
school of thought on the issue, and the one this author believes 
to be more consistent with the pro–arbitration legislative bias, 
is the freedom of contract model.  This approach is reflected in 
the decisions of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits, and em-
braces expanded review when it reflects the will of the parties.   
This section will first discuss the debate between the two mod-
els adopted by the courts, and analyze the competing public pol-
icy interests at play.  This section will subsequently review the 
often–advanced debate over the jurisdiction of federal courts.  
Finally, this section will turn to the international implications 
of expanded review, and offer some conclusions. 
A. Institutional Integrity vs. Freedom of Contract 
1. The Institutional Integrity Argument 
The Institutional Integrity Argument is perhaps the argu-
ment most often advanced in supporting a denial of expanded 
judicial review.  It comes as no surprise that institutional integ-
rity and freedom of contract collide quite frequently when ana-
lyzing contractual provisions allowing for expanded judicial re-
view.  After all, the two models emphasize completely different 
aspects of arbitrated disputes, and, again not surprisingly, ar-
rive at diametrically opposed conclusions.  Thus, a pre–dispute 
arbitration agreement providing for expanded judicial review 
would likely be enforced according to its terms in the Third,182 
Fourth,183 Fifth184 Circuits, but would be denied the same treat-
ment if enforcement was sought in the Ninth,185 Seventh,186 
Eighth,187 and Tenth Circuits.188  As for the remaining Circuits, 
the outcome is truly unpredictable.189   
  
 182. Roadway Packaging Sys. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 183. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 1997 WL 452245 (4th 
Cir. 1997). 
 184. Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
 185. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 2003 WL 22025130 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 186. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 
F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 187. UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc., v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 
1998). 
 188. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 189. See Hamlin, supra note 148, at 54. 
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The argument regarding arbitral and institutional integrity 
has been advanced with vigor by a number of scholars and 
while its tenets are admittedly nebulous, the key element seems 
to be freedom of the adjudicatory forum from external forces 
that may affect the authority of the adjudicator and the impar-
tiality of the process.190  With respect to arbitral institutions, the 
argument is the need to shield against undue interference by 
the judiciary.191  In the case of the courts, institutional integrity 
presumably dictates that the courts “neither be captured by ma-
joritarian forces nor by the whims of particular litigants, who 
are ill–positioned to protect the interests of the federal judici-
ary.”192  The arguments in favor of denying expanded review 
based on this precept can effectively be reduced to a select few, 
which will be discussed in turn.   
First, scholars and practitioners who embrace this viewpoint 
have argued that a distinction must be drawn between the par-
ties’ ability to influence the arbitral process, and their ability to 
prescribe the conduct of reviewing courts.193  In other words, the 
freedom of parties to set the ground rules in arbitration does 
not extend beyond the arbitral process itself. The proponents of 
this argument rely on the absence of any specific language to 
the contrary in the Supreme Court cases discussing arbitration, 
as well as on the particularity with which the statutes describe 
judicial scope of review.  Specifically, they discuss the fact that 
the extensive freedom to shape arbitral procedure has never 
been held to explicitly apply to the ulterior judicial review.194  
Rather, they claim that the limited judicial review provided by 
statute is an indication of the defined and limited role the 
courts are intended to play in the arbitration arena, notwith-
standing any contrary understanding of the parties.   
  
 190. Victoria L. C. Holstein, Co–Opting the Federal Judiciary: Contractual 
Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 12 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 
276 (2001). 
 191. Id. at 279 (citing Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 
(7th Cir. 1983)). 
 192. Id. at 279 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 
U.S. 833, 850 (1986)). 
 193. See UHC Management, 148 F.3d at 997 (1997); Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934; 
LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 891; Chicago Typogr., 935 F.2d at 1504.   
 194. See Smit, supra note 49, at 151. 
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However, the statutes are just as susceptible to interpretation 
as default rules, which can be replaced or eliminated by private 
agreements of the parties.195  The latter interpretation can be 
derived from the same statutory and common law scheme on 
which the proponents of the judicial integrity model rely.  The 
absence of any specific statutory or case language to the con-
trary opens the door just as widely for a “default rules” ap-
proach.196  When approached through this prism, the statutory 
scheme creates a rebuttable presumption, susceptible to 
change, and which “grants the ultimate power of decision–
making to the parties.”197  In support of this interpretation, one 
might turn, as Professor Rau has, to the similar provision in the 
English Arbitration Act, which allows parties to appeal ques-
tions of law without leave of the court, if they have so agreed.198  
When examined from a purely domestic viewpoint, this issue is 
clearly not resolved by the statute because there is no explicit 
language on the issue in the FAA.  Consequently, the underly-
ing policy objectives of the statute must be taken into account in 
suggesting a solution.  This is precisely what Professor Cole did, 
and her conclusion finds the default rule scheme to be the pref-
erable alternative, due to the significance of the pro–arbitration 
freedom of contract policy.199  In her Article, Professor Cole holds 
that the legislature likely intended to simply codify what they 
perceived to be the consensus regarding judicial review at the 
time, without contemplating that parties might be interested in 
expanding review.200  Thus, the statute does not address expan-
sion of judicial review at all, and arguments both in favor of and 
against expanded review have been founded on this apparent 
loophole.  However, as Prof. Cole rightly points out, the default 
rule approach which would allow parties a greater degree of 
  
 195. This opinion was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Gateway Tech., Inc. v. 
MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 196. Alan S. Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 225, 231 (1997). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id at n.33. 
 199. Sarah R. Cole, Managerial Litigants?  The Overlooked Problem of Party 
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1258 (2000) (stating 
that interpreting the statute as a default scheme is preferable “given the im-
portance of freedom of contract and the presumption in favor of finding that 
the FAA creates a set of default rules.”). 
 200. Id. at 1254. 
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authority in setting the terms of the arbitration, seems to be 
more in tune with the past and current policies regarding arbi-
tration. 
Second, proponents of the institutional integrity argument 
advance the notion that expanded judicial review would in fact 
be a wasteful allocation of judicial resources.  As one commenta-
tor stated, the extent to which a court reviews a decision made 
by an adjudicatory body is a function of a judgment as to the 
extent to which judicial resources should be made available for 
this purpose.201  In making this decision, Professor Smit contin-
ues, the body politic considers the interests of the parties with 
respect to the type of review they wish to have.  Ultimately, 
however, the decision is up to the body politic not the parties, 
and an agreement by the parties on that question is irrelevant 
because the parties have no authority to determine how public 
resources are to be spent.202  While the rationale behind this ar-
gument is conceptually very elegant, the argument still does not 
resolve the issue, because it departs from a flawed premise.  
The premise for Professor Smit’s argument is the assumption 
that society or the body politic have a choice in the matter, and 
can therefore opt not to allocate judicial resources.  Upon closer 
scrutiny, this premise turns out to be unfounded. 
It is, in this author’s opinion, beyond argument that parties 
have a right to resort to the judicial system to resolve their civil 
disputes.  It is equally clear that this right entitles them to ei-
ther pursue an action in the court system in the form of litiga-
tion, or, where the option is available,203 to circumvent the judi-
cial system and engage in arbitration in order to resolve their 
disputes.  Furthermore, it has been conceded by institutional 
integrity advocates that arbitration, even in a form which per-
mits expanded review, saves judicial resources, because the 
burden on the reviewing court is much smaller than that of a 
  
 201. See Smit, supra note 49, at 150. 
 202. Id. 
 203. There are hardly any areas of the law where arbitration is not avail-
able as a means of adjudication.  See Kenneth M. Curtin, Judicial Review of 
Arbitral Awards, 55 DISP. RESOL. J. 57 (2001) (discussing cases in which the 
Supreme Court has sanctioned arbitration as a means of dispute resolution 
where the subject matter of the dispute implicated fundamental issues of pub-
lic policy, such as securities violations, RICO claims, anti–trust causes of ac-
tion, employment discrimination and civil rights cases.) 
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full trial.204  In sum, since recourse to the civil courts is a matter 
of right, and arbitration, even with expanded judicial review, 
serves to conserve judicial resources, it follows that individuals 
are entitled to engage in such arbitration because by their ac-
tions they would impose a lesser burden on judicial resources. 
Third, proponents of the institutional integrity model argue 
that expanded judicial review would work against some of the 
very attributes making arbitration a viable and desirable alter-
native to litigation, namely finality, speed and cost–
effectiveness.205  Consequently they propose that upon expand-
ing judicial review arbitration will become merely a form of first 
instance adjudication.  The wide opportunity for review will be 
abused by the parties, the argument continues, and one–step 
adjudications will be transformed into four–step adjudica-
tions.206  
The possibility that expanded review will have the effect of 
prolonging proceedings in the manner described above can not 
be disputed in good faith.  However, proponents of this argu-
ment fail to address one detail which, in this case, completely 
changes the perspective, namely that the parties have agreed to 
this expanded form of judicial review.  Therefore, the argument 
that the arbitral process is no longer as advantageous does not 
withstand scrutiny.  Clearly, all parties to an arbitration who 
have even a modicum of sophistication realize that the effect of 
expanding judicial review is to potentially prolong the dispute 
resolution process.  However, the extension of these proceedings 
is but one factor in the wide array of considerations parties take 
into account at the time of negotiating the agreement, and thus 
their choice to forego a speedy and final arbitration should not 
be underestimated or dismissed as perfunctory by outsiders un-
familiar with all aspects of the dispute.  A further argument 
could be made that the lack of court deference to the parties’ 
wishes might, while preserving the finality and efficiency of ar-
  
 204. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 n.6 (“We recognize, of course, that even under 
expanded standards of review, arbitration reduces the burden on the district 
courts....Reviewing an arbitration award is certainly less work than hearing 
the entire case pursuant to diversity or federal question jurisdiction.”). 
 205. See Smit, supra note 49, at 151. 
 206. Id.  (discussing the possibility that awards would be reviewed by courts 
of first instance, then subjected to review by appellate courts, and finally by 
the courts of highest instance). 
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bitration, cause an even greater disservice to the institution of 
arbitration.  The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that 
when engaging in arbitration the parties give up some of the 
security of in–court procedures in favor of a dispute resolution 
process tailored to their desires.207  Efficiency and finality are 
the byproducts of such tailor–made processes.  It stands to rea-
son that such degrees of finality and efficiency are desirable 
effects only if the parties actually want them to occur.  If parties 
do not desire this, they should be able to opt for a more elabo-
rate process.  If the courts preclude their ability to opt for a 
process with more extensive judicial review, parties might think 
twice before relinquishing the procedural safeguards of litiga-
tion.  Since the promotion of arbitration is clearly established 
federal policy, it is easy to recognize how court imposition of 
strict review standards might violate the interests promoted by 
this policy. 
Finally, some commentators have argued that expanded re-
view is socially undesirable.  They argue that arbitration im-
plies decision making by arbitrators specifically selected for 
their expertise in a particular field, in a manner which might 
not necessarily meet with approval in the lower courts because 
arbitrators are free to stray from the rigors of the law in render-
ing awards.208  In other words, having experts decide arbitrable 
disputes is of paramount importance to society, and their ability 
to fashion creative solutions which best address the presented 
problems in the interest of the common good should not be lim-
ited by the constraints of applicable law.209  This proposition is 
largely true, but with one important distinction.  It is indisput-
able that the arbitration process gives experts a needed voice, 
and that having them render decisions advances the state of the 
law for all of us.  However, if courts are reduced to the function 
of merely enforcing or denying arbitral awards, without an op-
  
 207. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) 
(stating that parties have the right to a judicial decision on the merits, but 
“where the party has agreed to arbitrate, he or she, in effect, has relinquished 
much of that right’s practical value”).  See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 
U.S. at 628 (holding that when agreeing to arbitrate, a party “trades the pro-
cedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, infor-
mality and expedition of arbitration”). 
 208. See Smit, supra note 49, at 151–52. 
 209. Id. at 152. 
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portunity to discuss the reasoning for the arbitral decision, the 
advancement of the law is stalled, as arbitral decisions carry no 
precedential value.210 Thus, expansion of judicial review gives 
the courts of first instance the opportunity to establish a record, 
and to include the reasoning of expert arbitrators into the body 
of the law in the form of written decisions. This procedure bet-
ter advances the state of the law and facilitates the necessary 
beneficial input from experts in the field.   
2. Freedom of Contract 
The Freedom of Contract, or party autonomy, viewpoint is a 
lot more concise by comparison, and much more direct.  It main-
tains the ability of participants in arbitration proceedings to 
negotiate and agree upon the manner in which these proceed-
ings will unfold, setting the time, place, procedure, etc.  Propo-
nents of this approach further hold that an integral part of the 
parties’ ability to determine the structure and form of the dis-
pute resolution process is the scope of judicial review.  Thus, the 
argument goes, without a mutually agreeable judicial review of 
the arbitral decision, the power to define the arbitral process is 
meaningless.  
This argument flows naturally, given the unequivocally con-
tractual nature of the arbitration process.211  As one commenta-
tor noted, “heightened judicial oversight of arbitration awards 
finds support in the philosophical underpinnings of contract 
law.”212   The reason advanced for this proposition goes to the 
very core of fundamental property rights, namely that the right 
  
 210. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 67, at 14 n.31.   
Confidentiality...has had a negative impact on the development of 
standardization of commercial practices.  Confidentiality prevents the 
dissemination of rulings and reasons, and because arbitration awards 
do not lead to any official precedent or newly established legal princi-
ple, it may remove a highly valued feature underlying commercial re-
lationships, namely certainty and consistency. 
Id.  
 211. LEONARD RISKIN & JAMES WESTERBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND 
LAWYERS 228 (2d ed. 1998) (“Arbitration is a contractual process.  With few 
exceptions, parties arbitrate because they have agreed to do so, either in a 
contract entered into before the dispute arose or in an ad hoc agreement after 
the dispute arose.”). 
 212. See Davis, supra note 94, at 130. 
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to enter into contracts is derived from the individual’s funda-
mental right to own property.213  It stands to reason that with-
out the freedom to dispose of property in the way one sees fit, 
the right to property ownership itself becomes meaningless.214   
In a society which holds the right to property ownership in such 
high regard, it is difficult to find a reason to justify the interfer-
ence of the government, even in its incarnation as the judicial 
branch, with the express will of the owner in disposing of his or 
her property.  At a very basic level, the expression of individual 
desires as to the disposition of property takes the form of freely 
negotiated agreements among property owners.215  Thus, inas-
much as arbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract, 
and contracts are the result of property ownership rights, the 
conclusion can be drawn that property ownership rights give 
rise to the arbitral resolution of disputes.  This conclusion is not 
necessarily novel, but its application to the issue of expanded 
judicial review has some significant implications. 
Since it is the right to freely dispose of property that gives 
rise to agreements to arbitrate, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to argue that the judicial branch should refuse to give due 
course to some of these wishes, i.e., expanded judicial review.  
Nevertheless, some argue that expanded review of arbitral 
  
 213. Id., citing Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adju-
dication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1715 (1976) (“the rationale for contract law is 
derivative from that of property ... [because] one who breaches deprives the 
promisee in a sense no less real than the thief”).  
 214. Id., citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT, 287 (Peter Las-
lett ed., 2d ed. 1967), reprinting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF 
CIVIL GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 1698).  (“All Men are naturally in...a State of per-
fect Freedom, to...dispose of their Possessions as they see fit...Property rights 
are worthless unless the owner may dispose of his property without govern-
mental interference.  Otherwise, all free and voluntary Contracts cease, and 
are void, in the World...and all the Grants and Promises of man in power, are 
but Mockery and Collusion.”). 
 215. Id. at 130 n.435, (discussing the Kantian interpretation of societal Jus-
tice as an aggregate of free wills freely joined [in contract]: “Justice is there-
fore the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can 
be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of 
freedom”; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 34 (John 
Ladd trans., 1965) (1797)).  See also Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 
46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559 (1933) (“free contract assures the greatest amount 
of liberty for all”).  
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awards alters the very features that confer upon arbitration its 
most fundamental advantages: expeditiousness, cost–effectiven- 
ess, etc.  The reasoning behind this assertion is that the limited, 
statutorily prescribed, judicial review is what assures the bind-
ing nature and unequivocal enforcement of arbitral awards.  
Hence, subjecting these awards to the scrutiny of the courts 
would undermine the character of the awards, thus negating 
the advantages of the entire arbitration process, and transform-
ing it into an imperfect precursor to extended litigation.  These 
worries, however, are sorely misplaced.   
First, the previously narrow scope of review has not pre-
vented litigators from challenging arbitral awards with gusto.216  
Thus, the argument that the current review of arbitral deci-
sions preserves the expeditiousness of arbitration is signifi-
cantly flawed.  Second, because arbitration is a contractual en-
deavor, the courts would do more to promote arbitration if they 
were to heed the parties’ instructions as expressed in their con-
tracts, rather than impose a heavy–handed reading of the appli-
cable statutes.  This way, parties could be assured that not only 
the arbitral tribunal, but also the reviewing courts, would take 
their concerns into account and heed their directives.  This out-
come would encourage more parties to submit their disputes to 
arbitration, lightening the case load of the courts.  Third, those 
who argue that the benefits of arbitration ought to be protected 
in spite of the desires of those who would submit to arbitration, 
make a fundamental mistake as to the character of arbitration 
itself.  It is true that expeditiousness and cost–effectiveness are 
significant attractive features of arbitration.217  However, most 
parties submit to arbitration in order to resolve disputes accord-
ing to their wishes in an extra–judicial framework.218  Speed and 
  
 216. Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble With Arbitra-
tion, 1985 LITIG. J. 30 (1985).  
 217. See Davis, supra note 94, at 51.   
 218. Id.  
The central element of arbitration is the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the arbitration agreement.  The agreement determines 
the process.  Informality may flow from the agreement, but it need 
not, for the parties may insist to adhere to arcane rules of evidence or 
on wearing powdered wigs during the hearing.  Privacy may flow 
from the agreement, but it need not, for the parties may broadcast 
the proceedings on public access television. 
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lesser costs are the effects of choosing private tribunals, but 
they are not necessarily ends in themselves.  They are desirable 
attributes, to be sure, but their desirability does not fundamen-
tally carry the load of the argument against expanded review.  
Also, expanded review does not completely do away with the 
speed of arbitration, but instead lessens the distance on the ex-
peditiousness spectrum, between full–blown litigation and non–
reviewable arbitration.  Furthermore, other important advan-
tages of arbitration, such as confidentiality of the proceedings, 
remain in force even if expanded review is allowed.  Thus, in 
this author’s opinion, while expanded review may somewhat 
prolong the dispute resolution process, it confers other signifi-
cant advantages upon the parties, such as increased certainty 
that awards would conform with the applicable law and princi-
ples of justice and equity.   
Yet another advantage may be that such review could force 
arbitrators to approach their positions as decision-makers with 
more seriousness, and to weigh the matters to be decided more 
carefully, because they would be fully aware of the specter of 
judicial review.  These advantages are not negligible to partici-
pants in international commerce.  Therefore, if the courts forced 
parties to choose between two very narrow alternatives, full–
blown litigation, or arbitration with almost no judicial review, it 
would likely cause great harm to the arbitral institution.  After 
all, the more the dispute resolution processes reflect the wishes 
of the parties, the more likely the parties are to choose them 
over litigation.  Finally, it is worth reiterating that expanded 
review exists in such scenarios because it represents the ex-
press wish of the parties to the arbitration agreement.  Thus, as 
a matter of common sense, denying parties the opportunity to 
have their wishes respected would do more to push the arbitra-
tion process towards the rigorous and inflexible nature of litiga-
tion, instead of the expanded review which the parties desire.   
Another interesting point is raised by the arguments of some 
institutional integrity advocates who point to the tradition of 
limited review expressed in U.S. statutes and international 
convention as proof positive of the desirability of denying ex-
panded review.  As Professor Rau aptly notes, this argument 
merely begs the question to be asked of any long–standing tra-
  
Id.  
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dition which potentially impedes development and achievement 
of the greater good, why?219  The answer Professor Rau cites to 
this question is that the legislature had intended to “insulate 
from parochial or intrusive judicial review awards that the par-
ties intended in the usual sense to be binding.”220   However, this 
is not the end of the inquiry, and the question must be asked 
again why?  The logical answer is that the  “primary impetus... 
was precisely to encourage resort to arbitration by creating a 
safe harbor for the results of a contractually-agreed process.”221  
Following the argument to its logical endpoint, the result is 
clear: the rationale for restricted review falls apart when the 
parties to arbitration want to do away with this protection of 
the statute and opt for expanded review.222  The public policy 
considerations expressed by the Supreme Court in connection 
with expanded review support the freedom of contract ap-
proach.   
B.  Public Policy Debate 
The importance of the policy favoring enforcement of arbitra-
tion clauses, especially in international arbitration, was un-
equivocally reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the Mitsubishi 
Motors vs. Soler Chryler–Plymouth decision.223  In that decision 
  
 219. Allan S. Rau, “Arbitrability” and Judicial Review: A Brief Rejoinder, 13 
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 71, 72 (2002). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. In the words of Justice Blackmun,  
The Bremen and Scherk establish a strong presumption in favor of 
enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice–of–forum provi-
sions.  Here, as in Scherk, that presumption is reinforced by the em-
phatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.  And at 
least since this Nation=s accession in 1970 to the [New York] Con-
vention, and the implementation of the Convention in the same year 
by amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act, that federal policy ap-
plies with special force in the field of international commerce. 
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 620 (1985).  See 
generally Vimar Seguros Y Raseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky (REEFER), 515 U.S. 
528 (1995);  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477 (1988) (discussing the “current strong endorsement of the federal statutes 
favoring [arbitral] method of resolving disputes”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. 
v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982) (noting a “liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements”). 
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the Court had relied on its previous language to reiterate the 
pro–arbitration bias to be applied by the U.S. courts in review-
ing arbitral awards.  In Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co. the 
Court stated that “the expansion of American business and in-
dustry will hardly be encouraged, if, notwithstanding solemn 
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes 
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.”224  This 
strong bias, reaffirmed in the Mitsubishi case, was reiterated by 
the Supreme Court in its decision in Vimar Seguros, where the 
Court announced that “if the United States is to be able to gain 
the benefits of international accords and have a role as a 
trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be 
most cautious before interpreting domestic legislation in such 
manner as to violate international agreements.”225  The Court 
went on to warn U.S. courts that skepticism regarding the com-
petence of foreign arbitrators “must give way to contemporary 
principles of international comity and commercial practice.”226   
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Vimar Seguros brought up an in-
teresting point, namely that submitting disputes to independ-
ent and separate fora for dispute resolution might result in a 
lack of uniformity which could interfere with international 
trade by increasing the level of uncertainty.227  While this is a 
valid concern, most important for the purpose of our discussion 
is the fact that the Supreme Court, in a seven to one decision 
overwhelmingly chose to ignore the concerns raised by Justice 
Stevens in favor of a liberal, freedom of contract approach to 
arbitration.  The Court clearly opted to disregard  potential un-
certainty as to the outcome of disputes in favor of the certainty 
that the parties’  wishes, as expressed in the freely negotiated 
terms of the contract, would be respected by national courts.  
The lesson to be drawn is that in reviewing arbitral awards the 
terms of the contract should take precedence over any consid-
erations of expeditiousness, judicial economy, or any other ad-
vantages which arbitration in its purest form might bring to the 
gamut of methods of dispute resolution.  Thus, judging by the 
language in the Supreme Court’s previous decisions, if the 
  
 224. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). 
 225. Vimar Seguros, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995). 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 542. 
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Court were to address the issue in the future, it would most 
likely endorse expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.  
It is important to note that the appellate court cases dis-
cussed above all involved domestic arbitrations, or awards 
sought to be enforced under the domestic federal arbitration 
law.228  Thus, in none of these cases have the courts had the op-
portunity to consider the implications of expanded judicial re-
view on an award sought to be enforced under the New York 
Convention.  Nevertheless, the domestic decisions provide us 
with important clues as to the potential outcomes of such cases.  
The current domestic arbitration law reflects a very strong pro–
arbitration bias on the part of the legislature and the federal 
courts.  This bias applies with particular force in the interna-
tional context.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in 
situations involving international awards, the U.S. courts 
would be even more likely to respect the wishes of the parties, 
as expressed in freely negotiated arbitration agreements.    
C. Jurisdiction 
One of the main arguments of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago 
Typographical, and of institutional integrity advocates in gen-
eral, in opposing expanded review is the viewpoint that the 
agreement of the parties attempted to create federal jurisdic-
tion.229  Presumably, what the Seventh Circuit meant by “juris-
diction” in Chicago Typographical was not the classical inter-
pretation given to the expression by the federal courts, because 
the Seventh Circuit had clearly recognized that federal subject 
matter jurisdiction existed in that case due to federal ques-
tion.230  Rather, what Judge Posner likely meant was that the 
parties could not contract to enlarge the scope of review set 
forth by the statute within the exclusive parameters of the 
court’s jurisdiction to review arbitral awards.  In Judge Posner’s 
opinion, such a course of action was legally unacceptable be-
cause “federal courts do not review the soundness of arbitration 
  
 228. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994). 
 229. Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1501 (1991). 
 230. Id. at 1503.  (“The basis of federal jurisdiction was section 301 of the 
Taft–Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which creates federal jurisdiction over suits 
to enforce labor contracts.  There is no doubt of the applicability of section 
301.”). 
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awards, [and] an agreement to submit a dispute...to arbitration 
is a contractual commitment to abide by the arbitrator’s inter-
pretation.”231   
It is clearly the case that an alternative source of subject 
matter jurisdiction is always necessary in cases where parties 
seek to enforce domestic awards under Chapter I of the FAA.  
There is ample precedent on the issue, which indicates that 
Chapter I of Title Nine of the U.S. Code does not by itself act as 
a source of federal subject matter jurisdiction.  This issue was 
resolved by a footnote in the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construc-
tion Corporation.232  The Moses holding has not been revisited by 
the Court, and therefore constitutes valid precedent.233  It is also 
undisputed that a federal court would have subject matter ju-
risdiction to decide a dispute if the parties can establish that 
federal question jurisdiction arises.234  However, as the Second 
Circuit noted, “simply raising a federal issue in a complaint will 
not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction.”235 
  
 231. Id. at 1504–05. 
 232. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).  In relevant part, the footnote provides:  
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal 
court jurisdiction.  It  creates a body of federal substantive law estab-
lishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, 
yet it does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. 1331 [granting jurisdiction over all civil actions aris-
ing under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States] or 
otherwise.  Section 4 provides for an order compelling arbitration 
 only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a 
suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citi-
zenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction be-
fore the order can issue.   
Id. 
 233. See e.g. Perpetual Securities, Inc. v. Tang & Hua Yu Chen, 290 F.3d 
132, 136 (2nd Cir. 2002), aff’g US v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 32 F.3d 727, 731 (2nd Cir. 1994); International Insurance 
Company v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 
2002) aff’g Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1995).   
 234. Federal jurisdiction exists where a well–pleaded complaint “establishes 
either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right 
to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal 
law.”  Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 
1, 27–28 (1983). 
 235. See Perpetual Securities, 290 F.3d at 136. 
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Nevertheless, while Chapter I of Title Nine does not create 
subject matter jurisdiction, the situation is quite different in the 
case of international awards sought to be enforced under the 
New York Convention.236  With respect to foreign arbitral 
awards, the New York Convention is the law applicable to the 
review and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  Thus, the 
New York Convention constitutes the definitive document with 
respect to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and plays 
an important role in the jurisdiction analysis because the New 
York Convention, as enacted by Chapter II of Title Nine, explic-
itly confers subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts.237  
In relevant part, Section 203 provides that “an action or pro-
ceeding falling under the [New York] Convention shall be 
deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United 
States.  The district courts of the United States...shall have 
original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regard-
less of the amount in controversy.”238  Section 202 explains the 
issue further, defining which actions or awards fall under the 
New York Convention:  
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a le-
gal relationship...which is considered as commercial...falls un-
der the Convention.  An agreement...which is entirely between 
citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under 
the Convention unless that relationship involves property lo-
cated abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, 
  
 236. It is important when discussing the lack of federal court subject matter 
jurisdiction under the FAA, that the reader only consider Chapter I of Title 
Nine of the United States Code.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.  Although at times the 
“FAA” designation has often been applied to all of Title Nine, federal appellate 
courts have generally used the designation to refer only to Chapter I of that 
title.  (See e.g. International Insurance Company v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y 
Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002); Beiser v. Weyler, et. al., 284 F.3d 
665, 666 (5th Cir. 2002); Daihatsu Motor Co. Ltd. v. Terrain Vehicles, Inc. 13 
F.3d 196, 198 (7th Cir. 1993).  But see Jain v. Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688–689 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (referring to Convention implementing legislation as “Chapter 2” of 
the FAA); Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 478, 
n.13 (9th Cir. 1991)).  Therefore, for purposes of this Note’s discussion of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, this author will assume that the “FAA” denomination 
refers only to Chapter I of Title Nine.  See 9 U.S.C.  §§ 1–16 (1994). 
 237. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (1994). 
 238. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). 
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or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign 
states.239   
Finally, Section 208 establishes the relationship between Chap-
ter I of Title Nine and the New York Convention, namely that 
Chapter I provides the gap–filler provisions in case the respec-
tive issue is not covered by the Convention.240  Pursuant to the 
clear statutory language, the existence of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction in arbitrations involving the New York Convention 
has been recognized by the federal courts.241  Hence, while in 
arbitrations applying U.S. law and involving only U.S. parties, 
the FAA or state arbitration statutes may apply, all other arbi-
tral awards can be enforced pursuant to the New York Conven-
tion, thus conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the federal 
courts.  Thus, when it comes to awards rendered or sought to be 
enforced under the New York Convention, the explicit grant of 
subject matter jurisdiction in Title Nine of the U.S. Code re-
solves the issue of subject matter jurisdiction conclusively. 
However, this explicit grant of subject matter jurisdiction 
does not do away with the objection that expanded review at-
tempts to impermissibly enlarge the role of the courts.  Like 
Chapter I of Title Nine, the New York Convention also contains 
a specific list of reasons for which the courts can vacate or mod-
ify awards, in Article V.242  Thus, if the parties were to contract 
for expanded review, the jurisdiction of the courts would, in the 
view of judicial integrity advocates,  be confined only to the pro-
  
 239. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). 
 240. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1994). (“Chapter I applies to actions and proceed-
ings brought under this chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict 
with this chapter or the [New York] Convention as ratified by the United 
States.”). 
 241. See Base Metal Trading v. OJSC et al., 283 F.3d 208, 212 (4th Cir. 
2002) (“the Convention and its implementing legislation...give federal district 
courts original jurisdiction over actions to compel or confirm foreign arbitral 
awards”); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 
F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Convention Provides Subject Matter Juris-
diction Over Glencore Grain’s Action To Enforce Its Arbitral Award”); Trans 
Chemical Limited v. China National Machinery Import and Export Corp., 161 
F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming the decision of the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas, 978 F. Supp. 266, 292 (S.D. Texas 1997)); In-
dustrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 
1440 (11th Cir. 1998); Productos Mercantiles e Industriales v. Faberge USA, 
Inc., 23 F.3d 41, 44 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
 242. See supra, Part I.B.2. 
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visions of Article V.  In response, freedom of contract propo-
nents could present the same arguments as in the domestic de-
bate with regard to expanded review, illustrated in Part II of 
this paper.  In cases where the New York Convention is in-
volved, the argument of freedom of contract proponents is 
strengthened further by the various U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions which emphasize the strong policy in favor of enforcement 
of arbitral agreements in the international context.243  The pre-
viously discussed cases have illustrated the way some of the 
federal circuits are likely to respond to a request to expand ju-
dicial review in the domestic setting.  However, it stands to rea-
son that when asked to do the same in a context involving the 
New York Convention, these courts would grant wider defer-
ence to the desires of the parties.   
D. International Implications 
Undoubtedly, in the near future U.S. courts will be asked to 
decide whether expansion of judicial review is a viable option in 
cases involving enforcement under the New York Convention.   
Similar concerns might arise in cases where American parties 
seek enforcement of international awards in other jurisdictions, 
pursuant to the New York Convention.   Interestingly enough, 
however, it seems that many jurisdictions have not yet had to 
deal with the question at all.244  However, given the legislative 
framework in place in many of these jurisdictions, it seems 
likely that even when presented with the issue, many would 
likely deny the parties’ request for expanded judicial review.  In 
this regard, it seems that the courts of the U.S., U.K., and the 
few other jurisdictions which permit expanded review for do-
mestic arbitrations, have reached a paradoxical impasse.  In 
granting wide deference to the parties’ freedom of contract, they 
would seem to have arrived at a result that is inimical to the 
underlying purpose of the New York Convention, which had 
attempted to achieve of a high level of homogeneity in the en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards.245    
In this regard, institutional integrity advocates would most 
likely argue that such a result would only add to the confusion 
  
 243. See supra, Part IV.B. 
 244. See supra, Part IV.B. 
 245. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
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and reticence of international commercial actors to engage in 
arbitration.246  However, this conclusion would be superficial for 
several reasons.  The New York Convention was adopted during 
a time when international arbitration was developing rapidly 
but independently in the various jurisdictions, and thus uni-
formity in enforcement was of paramount importance if arbitra-
tion was to function effectively over jurisdictional lines.  Fur-
thermore, at the time many of the jurisdictions were still very 
reticent toward enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and 
therefore a list of the acceptable grounds of review provided 
much needed clarity and restraint for the national courts.  Since 
then, however, the situation has changed dramatically.  Inter-
national arbitration has become commonplace and the sophisti-
cation of international actors and their counsel has also in-
creased significantly.  Furthermore, national courts have be-
come much more adept at recognizing and enforcing interna-
tional awards.  As a result, the uniformity of procedures, which 
was of paramount importance in the years preceding the adop-
tion of the New York Convention, is no longer a cardinal consid-
eration, because courts all over the world have come to respect 
the institution of arbitration as a viable and just means of dis-
pute resolutions.   
The New York Convention’s fundamental goal was the pro-
motion of arbitration as a viable means of resolution of interna-
tional disputes.  Yet the Convention may potentially diminish 
the willingness of parties to submit to arbitration if its provi-
sions are enforced without due regard to the primary impetus of 
decisions to arbitrate — freedom of contract.  It is therefore 
very important that the New York Convention remain in place 
as a default framework with respect to international arbitra-
tion, as a safeguard against potential attempts by governments 
or courts to encroach on the arbitral process.  However, in situa-
tions where the parties explicitly agree to circumscribe the 
precepts of the Convention and stipulate for expanded review, 
there is no reason why the courts should decline heeding their 
wishes. 
  
 246. See Vimar, 515 U.S. at 542. 
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CONCLUSION  
It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court will resolve the 
debate over expanded review in the near future.  However, 
when presented with the issue the Supreme Court will most 
likely support the freedom of contract viewpoint and allow for 
expanded judicial review.  In the past the Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of the public policy protecting the 
provisions of agreements to arbitrate, and has therefore granted 
parties wide deference in establishing the ground rules for arbi-
tration.  This policy is further enhanced in the sphere of inter-
national commerce by the Supreme Court’s respectful stance 
towards the needs of international commerce, and of the gen-
eral principles of comity among nations.  Therefore, it stands to 
reason that the only outcome consistent with the Court’s prior 
decisions and the policy interests at play in the debate sur-
rounding international arbitration would be reached by grant-
ing the express wishes of the contracting parties and endorsing 
expanded judicial review.   
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